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1Abstract
In this paper, we develop a model which explains why events in one mar-
ket may trigger similar events in other markets, even though at ﬁrst sight the
markets appear to be only weakly related. We allow for multiple equilibria
and learning dynamics in each market, and show that a jump between equilib-
ria in one market is contagious because it more than doubles the probability
of a similar jump in another market. We claim that contagion is strong since
equilibrium jumps become highly synchronised across markets. Spillovers are
weak because the instantaneous spillover of events from one market to an-
other is small. To illustrate our result, we demonstrate how a currency crisis
may be contagious with only weak links between countries. Other examples
where weak spillovers would create strong contagion are various models of
monetary policy, imperfect competition and endogenous growth.
Keywords: contagion, escape dynamics, learning, spillovers
JEL codes:E 5 ,F 4
21I n t r o d u c t i o n
On many occasions it is observed that developments in one market appear
to follow those in another market, despite the fact that the markets seem
to be only weakly related. One of the most obvious examples of this is the
contagious nature of currency crises, since a crisis in one country is often
followed by a crisis in another country, even though the two countries have
only weak trade or ﬁnancial linkages. Existing theories ﬁnd such phenomena
hard to explain and typically resort to the idea of correlated sunspots to
explain the contagion of events from one market to another. However, the
question then remains of why sunspots would be correlated across markets.
In this paper, we oﬀer an explanation for why developments in separate
markets may be synchronised even if there are no sunspots and spillovers
between markets are weak. Our proposed explanation is based on the learn-
ing processes which determine equilibrium in each market. We characterise
markets as having multiple equilibria, with jumps between equilibria occur-
ring endogenously through learning as in Sargent (1999), and show that an
equilibrium jump in one market signiﬁcantly increases the probability of an
equilibrium jump in the other market. The mechanism is not one in which
agents observe an equilibrium jump in the other market and this directly
induces an equilibrium jump in their own market, since we would interpret
that as a strong spillover between markets. Instead, we restrict agents to
only observe events in their own market, in which case the model is self-
referential and weak spillovers are the only possible source of contagion. In
3other words, we demonstrate that weak spillovers create a channel by which
an equilibrium jump in one market is likely to trigger an equilibrium jump
in the other market.
Our preferred example to illustrate contagious equilibrium jumps is the
example model of endogenous currency crises of Cho and Kasa (2003, p. 18-
22), which itself is derived by simplifying and adding learning to the third
generation currency crisis model of Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2000).
We analyse a model of two small open economies and one large economy,
in which international spillovers between the two small economies are weak.
Whilst our example is drawn from the currency crisis literature, our results
are applicable to a more general class of self-referential models with equi-
librium jumps occurring through learni n g . T h i sc l a s si n c l u d e sm o d e l so f
monetary policy, imperfect competition, growth, and alternative models of
currency crises, as discussed by Cho, Williams and Sargent (2002), Bullard
and Cho (2002), Primiceri (2004), Williams (2004) and Kasa (2004). Equi-
librium jumps have the potential to be contagious in all these models if there
is another similar market and weak spillover of events from one market to
another.
Consistent deﬁnitions of the terms contagion and spillover are yet to
emerge in the literature. We take contagion to mean that an equilibrium
jump in one market leads to a signiﬁcant increase in the correlation of events
across similar markets. Our understanding of the term spillover follows Mas-
son (1999), who writes that “Spillover eﬀects explain why a crisis in one coun-
try may aﬀect other emerging markets through linkages operating through
4trade, economic activity, or competitiveness.” We argue that even if such
linkages are weak, an equilibrium jump in one market is likely to trigger
an equilibrium jump in the other, resulting in an increase in the correlation
between the two markets during the period of the jumps.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes a
version of the Cho and Kasa (2003, p. 18-22) model of endogenous currency
crises in which two small economies interact with a large economy but there
are no spillovers between the small economies. For this benchmark case,
equilibrium jumps will not be contagious by deﬁn i t i o n . I nS e c t i o n3w e
introduce a weak unilateral spillover from one small economy to the other,
with no spillover in the opposite direction, and show how equilibrium jumps
in the ﬁrst economy are likely to trigger similar jumps in the other. Section
4 presents results with weak bilateral spillovers. A ﬁnal section concludes.
2 Model with no spillovers
The case of no spillovers between the small economies is a natural benchmark
from which to start the analysis. Our initial model therefore consists of the
following ingredients: true structural relationships linking output in each
small open economy to the economy’s exchange rate with respect to the
large economy; a description of each central bank’s perception of its own
economy; a derivation of optimal exchange rate policy for each central bank;
and a deﬁnition of equilibrium. In keeping with the original Cho and Kasa
(2003, p. 18-22) model, there are no spillovers between the small economies
5in the benchmark model.
2.1 Structural relationships
The structure of each small open economy is represented by two relationships.
Equation (1) is an open-economy expectations-augmented Phillips curve, in
which output  is determined by its natural rate 0, unexpected movements
in the country’s own exchange rate,  − −1, and an output disturbance
1. Equation (1’) is the analogous Phillips curve for the other small open
economy, with the same structure and variables identiﬁed by the ∗ super-
script. As both countries are small open economies, exchange rates  and
∗
 are deﬁned relative to the currency of the large economy, for example the
US dollar. Unexpected depreciations in the country’s currency are assumed
to decrease output ( is negative)1.
 = 0 + ( − −1)+1 (1)

∗







Equations (2) and (2’) state that the exchange rate in each economy is a
function of the level set by the respective central bank, ˆ  or ˆ ∗
,p l u sac o n t r o l
error 2 or ∗
2.W er e f e rt oˆ  and ˆ ∗
 as intended exchange rates. Since private
agents are assumed to have rational expectations, the expected exchange
1The sign of  in the Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2000) model depends on the
degree to which unexpected devaluations aﬀect balance sheets and the value of debt. We
follow the lead of Cho and Kasa (2003, p. 10) and assume that balance sheet eﬀects are
strong and unexpected devaluations lead to a contraction in output.
6rates in equations (1) and (1’) will be equal to the intended exchange rates.
Unexpected exchange rate movements are caused by the control errors 2
and ∗
2.








2.2 Central bank perceptions of the economy
Following Cho and Kasa (2003, p. 19), we assume that each central bank does
not know the true structure of its economy. Instead, they have approximating
models which allow for the possibility that there might be a long-run trade-oﬀ
between output and the exchange rate. The approximating models are subtly
misspeciﬁed because they describe a long-run relationship between output
and the level of the exchange rate, when in reality it is only unexpected
exchange rate movements that matter for output. Following the convention
of Evans and Honkapohja (2001), we write the perceived law of motion (PLM)
for each central bank as equations (3) and (3’).













 are approximation errors: the components of output movements
t h a te a c hc e n t r a lb a n kf a i l st oe x p l a i nb yi t sm o d e lw i t hal o n g - r u nt r a d e - o ﬀ
between output and the exchange rate.
7The central banks estimate the coeﬃcients of their perceived law of mo-
tion independently. To ensure there are no spillovers in the benchmark model,
we restrict each central bank to only use data from their own country in es-
timation. This means that central banks are self-referential in nature and so
precludes any contagion of equilibrium jumps that occurs because a central
bank in one country observe jumps in the other country. Conditional on this
data restriction, the central banks use discounted least squares techniques to
estimate the coeﬃcients of their perceived law of motion, as in Cho and Kasa
(2003, p. 19). Equations (4) and (5) are standard recursive formulae for dis-
counted least squares, with the matrix of regressors deﬁned as  =( 1)0.
The current estimates of the coeﬃcients are stacked in the vector  =( 0
1)0,w i t h	 a 2 × 2 matrix measuring the precision of the estimates.
	+1 = 	 + 
(
0
 − 	) (4)
+1 =  + 
	
−1
+1( − ) (5)
In discounting past data, central banks allow for the possibility of struc-
tural breaks, even though such breaks are not explicitly present in our model.
Under such circumstances, it is reasonable for the central bank to place more
weight on recent data than data from the distant past. Discounting at the
rate 
 gives a weight of (1−
)−1 to observations from  periods ago. Equa-
































2.3 Optimal exchange rate policy
The objective of each central bank, following Cho and Kasa (2003, p. 19), is
to minimise the extent to which its output and exchange rate deviate from
target values ¯  and ¯ . The central bank loss functions (6) and (6’) place equal
quadratic penalties on output and exchange rate deviations from target.2
L =(  − ¯ )






 − ¯ )
2 +( 
∗
 − ¯ )
2 (6’)
Optimal policy requires a central bank to set the intended exchange rate
to minimise expected losses, subject to the perceived law of motion of the
economy. As in Sargent (1999) and Cho and Kasa (2003, p. 19), we assume
that the central bank displays anticipated utility behaviour, following Kreps
(1998). This implies that a central bank takes its best estimates of the
coeﬃcients in the perceived law of motion as being the true values, ﬁxed now
and into the indeﬁnite future.3 The policy problem is static and the ﬁrst order
2See Gerali and Lippi (2002) for a discussion of how escape dynamics change with
diﬀerent weights in the loss function.
3Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2004) shows that equilibrium jumps are still possible
when a central bank treats its coeﬃcient estimates as uncertain.
9conditions for expected loss minimisation under anticipated utility behaviour
give policy rules (7) and (7’).
ˆ  =







¯  − ∗
1(∗





We obtain the equilibrium actual laws of motion (ALM) for output and
exchange rates by substituting the policy rules (7) and (7’) into the equations
for the true structure of the economy (1), (1’), (2) and (2’). Since events in
each country are independent, equilibrium jumps cannot be contagious and
we can focus on either country to see why the jumps occur. The actual laws
of motion (ALM) for output and the exchange rate in the ﬁrst country are
described by equations (8) and (9).
 = 0 + 2 + 1 (8)
 =




Ac o m p a r i s o no ft h ep e r c e i v e d( 3 )a n da c t u a l( 8 )l a w so fm o t i o nf o r
output reveals the existence of a continuum of self-conﬁrming equilibria in
the model. Abstracting from stochastic terms, beliefs  in each equilibrium
must satisfy condition (10), obtained by equating output under the perceived
and actual laws of motion.
100 = 0 + 1
µ





Two of the self-conﬁrming equilibria have clear intuitive economic inter-
pretations. One equilibrium has beliefs 1 =  and 0 = 0 −¯ +
2(0 − ¯ ),
with the central bank setting an intended exchange rate of ˆ  =¯ +(¯ −0).
We term this the Nash equilibrium, since it is the same as the outcome that
would prevail under discretionary policy if the central bank knows the true
structure of the economy (1) and (2). The other equilibrium has beliefs
1 =0and 0 = 0, and the central bank sets a intended exchange rate
of ¯ .W ed e n o t et h i st h eRamsey equilibrium,a si ti se q u i v a l e n tt ot h eo u t -
come that arises under commitment policy if the central bank knows the true
structure of the economy.
2.5 Calibration
In the full stochastic economy, it is diﬃcult to obtain further analytical re-
sults.4 To proceed, we therefore calibrate the model and analyse its behaviour
by simulation. Our calibration in Table 1 is based on the parameter values
4A series of remarkable papers by Williams (2003, 2004) shows how large deviations
theory can be used to obtain a numerical solution to the dominant behaviour of the econ-
omy. We are currently examining how best to integrate these methods into our analysis.












Table 1: Calibrated parameter values
In words, our calibration implies that the central bank targets output at a
level 5% above a zero natural rate; the exchange rate target is zero; surprise
appreciations translate one for one into increased output; the variance of
both shocks is 0.3; and policymakers place a weight of 0975−1 on data from
 periods ago.
2.6 Simulation results
The ﬁrst set of results we report are for a dynamic simulation of a single
small economy for 1600 periods. The top two panels of Figure 1 show the
behaviour of the exchange rate and output respectively. According to the
top left panel, the exchange rate has a tendency to appreciate towards the
Nash equilibrium level  = −5, but occasional large devaluations bring it
back to close to the Ramsey equilibrium level  =0 . In the top right panel,
12output has no clear trend and ﬂuctuates around its zero natural rate.
Figure 1: Simulation of the model with no spillovers
The bottom two panels of Figure 1 plot the evolution of central bank
beliefs about the economy. They illustrate that large depreciations in the
exchange rate are associated with a rapid realignment in beliefs (01) from
close to (−5−1) to close to (00). In other words, the economy jumps from
near the Nash self-conﬁrming equilibrium to near the Ramsey self-conﬁrming
equilibrium. Cho and Kasa (2003, p. 3) propose that such equilibrium jumps
may be an explanation for currency crises, since jumps coincide with the type
of dramatic exchange rate depreciations typically observed in a currency
crisis. More generally, the equilibrium jumps are an example of the type of
escape dynamics studied by Williams (2004).
13To understand the behaviour of the economy, it is necessary to explain
why the exchange rate tends to appreciate towards the Nash level and then
occasionally jumps back and depreciates to the Ramsey level. A full technical
analysis appears in Cho, Williams and Sargent (2002), so we focus on giving
an intuitive explanation.
The tendency of the exchange rate to appreciate arises because of the
eﬀect that control errors have on the incentive for a central bank to use pol-
icy to achieve output and exchange rate targets. Control errors 2 cause
unexpected movements in the exchange rate, which aﬀect output through
the open economy Phillips curve (1). As the slope of the Phillips curve is
negative, the resulting changes in exchange rate and output are negatively
correlated. The central bank (incorrectly because of its belief in a misspec-
iﬁed model) interprets this as evidence of a long-run negative relationship
between the two variables, creating an incentive for the central bank to ap-
preciate the exchange rate to stimulate output. The appreciation continues
until the exchange rate reaches its Nash level.
The jumps in the exchange rate occur because of rare combinations of
shocks that lead the central bank to think (correctly in this case) that there
is no long-run relationship between output and the exchange rate. With no
apparent trade-oﬀ to exploit, the central bank sets the intended exchange
rate equal to its target, at which point the actual exchange rate depreciates
rapidly to its Ramsey level. An insight into the nature of the rare combi-
nations that trigger jumps can be obtained by looking at the shocks hitting
14the economy around the time of large exchange rate devaluations.5 Figure 2
summarises the distribution of output shocks 1 and exchange rate control
errors 2 in the period immediately preceding an exchange rate devaluation
and for the next three periods. In each panel, the mostly likely combinations
of 1 and 2 are marked with a dot and surrounded by a one standard de-
viation conﬁdence region. The top left panel is for the shocks immediately
preceding a devaluation; in the top right panel the devaluation has already
begun. The bottom two panels are for shocks occurring as the devaluation
progresses.
5An alternative approach favoured by Cho, Williams and Sargent (2002) is to numeri-
cally solve for the dominant escape route from Nash to Ramsey equilibrium. In the limit,
the most likely combinations of shocks from our simulations should converge to the shocks
occurring along the dominant escape route.
15Figure 2: Distributions of shocks at the time of large devaluations
The panels in Figure 2 show considerable regularities in the distribution
of shocks around the time of a large devaluation. If the shocks 1 and 2 were
completely random then the most likely combination in each period would be
(00) and the conﬁdence region would be a perfect circle cutting the axes at
±0548, one standard deviation of each shock. Instead, the shocks appear to
be both positive and positively correlated in each period. This is reﬂected in
the most likely combinations of shocks lying in the positive-positive quadrant
and the conﬁdence regions being skewed towards the positive-positive and
negative-negative quadrants. The pattern is particularly clear in the period
16immediately preceding a devaluation. The salient features of the shocks are
summarised in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Large devaluations in the exchange rate tend to be preceded
by output shocks and exchange rate control errors that are (i) positively cor-
related and (ii) positive.
Property (i) that shocks tend to be positively correlated just before an
equilibrium jump is explained by Cho, Williams and Sargent (2002). The ba-
sic intuition can be understood by noting that, under normal circumstances,
control errors 2 lead to unexpected exchange rate changes and observable
movements in output, which reinforce the Nash equilibrium. However, if 2 is
positively correlated with the output shock 1 then the movement in output
will be oﬀset by an output shock, and output does not appear to react to
the exchange rate change. For example, a positive control error causes an
u n e x p e c t e dd e p r e c i a t i o no ft h ee x c h a n g er a t ea n dac o n t r a c t i o no fo u t p u t ,
but a positive output shock would oﬀset the output contraction and make it
appear that output has not reacted to the depreciation in the exchange rate.
Similarly, the expansion in output caused by an unexpected appreciation
of the exchange rate will be hard to observe if it coincides with a negative
output shock. In such circumstances, the central bank starts to discount
the possibility that there is a long-run relationship between output and the
exchange rate, the exchange rate depreciates and an equilibrium jump to
Ramsey is likely.
Property (ii) that shocks tend to be positive just before an equilibrium
17jump has received less attention in the literature.6 An intuitive explanation
for why positive shocks precede the jump is that they create a strong signal
that there is no relationship between output and the exchange rate. Figure
3 shows how the distribution of shocks 1 and 2 at time −1 maps into the
values of output  and the exchange rate  observed in the period immedi-
ately before the jump, along with the perceived laws of motion associated
with the Nash and Ramsey equilibria. The dot and one standard deviation
conﬁdence region now denote the most likely combinations of output and
t h ee x c h a n g er a t e . I nt h eﬁgure, it is clear that having both positive and
positively correlated shocks creates outcomes that appear more consistent
with Ramsey than Nash equilibrium beliefs. Furthermore, the predominance
of positive output shocks guarantees that output tends to be above its nat-
ural rate, which strengthens the signal that there is no long-run relationship
between output and the exchange rate.
6A notable exception is McGough (2004).
18Figure 3: Distribution of exchange rate and output before large devaluations
Taken together, the two properties of Proposition 1 imply signiﬁcant reg-
ularities in the distributions of shocks hitting the economy at the time of large
devaluations. The fact that equilibrium jumps are associated with particular
rare combinations of shocks will play an important role in explaining why
the jumps become contagious, even if there are only weak spillovers between
markets.
3 Model with weak unilateral spillovers
The essence of a spillover is that events in one market inﬂuence events in a
second market. We therefore proceed by introducing a mechanism whereby
developments in the ﬁrst small country spillover to the second small country.
Our assumption is that conditions in the ﬁrst small economy can be sum-
19marised by its exchange rate with respect to the large country, ,a n dt h a t
these conditions have a linear eﬀect on output ∗
 in the second small econ-
omy. Equations (11) and (11’) show how output is determined in each small
country in the presence of the spillover. As the direction of the spillover is
from the ﬁrst to the second small country and not vice versa,d e t e r m i n a t i o n
of output in the ﬁrst small country (11) is identical to that in the no spillovers
case (1).
 = 0 + ( − −1)+1 (11)

∗








The spillover mechanism is assumed to operate via ﬁnancial markets
through the eﬀect of the exchange rate on balance sheets and the value of
debt. A depreciation in the currency of the ﬁrst small economy with respect
to the large economy (an increase in ) improves the balance sheet position of
the second small economy and therefore boosts output (
∗ is positive).7 The
coeﬃcient 
∗ should be suﬃciently small to ensure that spillovers are weak.
We set 
∗ =0 1 so spillovers contribute only weakly to the determination of
7An alternative speciﬁcation for the open economy context would be to assume that
spillovers act through the bilateral exchange rate between the two small countries, in
which case the ﬁnal term in equation (11’) would be 
∗( − ∗
). The results with this
alternative speciﬁcation are very close to the results we report. Another possibility is to
assume that spillovers act through unexpected movements in the bilateral exchange rate,
i.e. the spillover term should be 
∗[−1( − ∗
) − ( − ∗
)]. In this case the spillover
proves too weak and it is not possible to obtain strong contagion.
20output in the second small economy.
The central banks are assumed to be unaware of the presence of spillovers:
they maintain their belief in the long-run relationship between output and the
exchange rate summarised by the perceived laws of motion (3) and (3’). This
introduces another subtle misspeciﬁcation in the perceived laws of motion
because a central bank interprets output movements induced by spillovers
as simple approximation errors rather than due to events in the other small
country.
Equilibrium in the model with weak unilateral spillovers is described by
Phillips curve equations (11) and (11’), exchange rate control equations (2)
and (2’), perceived laws of motion (3) and (3’), and exchange rate policy
rules (7) and (7’). As the ﬁrst country is not inﬂuenced by the second, its
behaviour in equilibrium is given by equations (8) and (9) as before, the
actual laws of motion for output and the exchange rate in the no spillovers
case. For the second country, the behaviour of the economy is shown by
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To study the implications of introducing weak unilateral spillovers, we
analyse long numerical simulations of the model and compare them to alter-
native simulations with no spillovers. Figure 4 shows one such comparison.
21Figure 4: Simulation of the model with unilateral spillovers
The top panel of Figure 4 shows the behaviour of the intended exchange
rates in the no spillovers case: the solid line is the intended exchange rate
ˆ  for the ﬁrst country; the dashed line is the intended exchange rate ˆ ∗

for the second country. With no spillovers, the intended exchange rates are
independent and there is no interaction between the countries. Even though
ˆ  jumps around period  =2 9 0 ,t h e r ei sn oe ﬀect on ˆ ∗
.I ns u ﬃciently long
22simulations, the correlation between ˆ  and ˆ ∗
 is zero.
The middle panel of Figure 4 shows simulated paths for intended exchange
rates when there are weak unilateral spillovers from the ﬁrst country to the
second. As the spillover is unidirectional, it has no eﬀect on the ﬁrst country
and the solid line in the middle panel is the same as in the upper panel for the
no spillovers case. In contrast, the dashed line for the intended exchange rate
in the second country is very diﬀerent. Rather than the gradual appreciation
seen with no spillovers, ˆ ∗
 jumps soon after the jump in ˆ .T h el a r g ed e v a l u -
ation in the ﬁrst country appears to have triggered a similar large devaluation
in the second country. We interpret this as evidence that equilibrium jumps
are strongly contagious in the model. The contagion leads to a positive cor-
relation between the intended exchange rates in the two countries. In long
simulations the correlation coeﬃcient is approximately 019.
To gauge the importance of spillovers, the bottom panel of Figure 4 plots
as a thin line the simulated path of output in the second country. There are
three factors in the model which can cause output to deviate from its nat-
ural rate: output shocks ∗
1, exchange rate control errors ∗
2, and spillovers
from the ﬁrst country 
∗. The thick line in the bottom panel shows the
deviation in output that is due to the third factor. The role of spillovers is
apparently small, with deviations due to spillovers barely discernible amongst
the much larger deviations caused by output shocks and unexpected exchange
rate movements. In variance decomposition terms, only 3% of the variance
in output in the second country is attributable to spillovers from the ﬁrst
country. It is in this sense that we claim to have only weak spillovers in the
23model.
An intuitive understanding of why weak spillovers are suﬃcient to cause
strong contagion can be obtained by recalling the pattern of shocks that typ-
ically precedes an equilibrium jump. According to Proposition 1 in Section
3, jumps tend to be triggered by a series of output shocks and exchange
rate control errors that are (i) positively correlated and (ii) positive. Weak
spillovers cause strong contagion by creating a mechanism whereby an equi-
librium jump in the ﬁrst country increases the probability that output shocks
in the second country are positive, which in turn makes it more likely that
there will be an equilibrium jump in the second country. During the initial
jump, the exchange rate in the ﬁrst country depreciates rapidly, which spills
over via 
∗→  0 into higher than expected output in the second country.
The spillover therefore creates conditions in the second country that are anal-
ogous to a run of positive ∗
2 output shocks. Condition (ii) is more likely to
be satisﬁed and the probability of an equilibrium jump in the second country
increases in the immediate aftermath of a jump in the ﬁrst country.8
The intuition is conﬁrmed by Table 2, which reports how the presence
of weak unilateral spillovers increases the probability of an equilibrium jump
in the second country occurring within a given number of periods of a jump
in the ﬁrst country. The increase in probability is heavily dependent on the
level of the exchange rate in the second country at the time the ﬁrst country
8A similar mechanism operates in the model of McGough (2004), where a permanent
but unobservable increase in the natural rate of output creates a series of positive output
shocks that increases the probability of an equilibrium jump.
24jumps, ranging from no change when ∗
  −2 to more than doubling when
∗
  −4. The dependency arises because conditions have to be ripe for an
equilibrium jump in the ﬁrst country to trigger a jump in the second country.
An exchange rate in the second country close to the Nash level ∗
 = −5 puts
the country in the “danger zone” and makes it more susceptible to jumps
and contagion. Conversely, if the exchange rate in the second country is
already close to its Ramsey level ∗
 =0then jumps and contagion are highly
unlikely.
Probability of jump in second country
within  periods of jump in ﬁrst country








0000 0000 0000 0000
0001 0011 0017 0018








0000 0000 0000 0000
0003 0008 0013 0018
0024 0067 0128 0258
Table 2: Probability of equilibrium jumps in second country
Further evidence that contagion is strong is provided in Table 3, which
25gives summary statistics for the relationship between the exchange rates of
the two countries in the frequency domain. Coherence measures the corre-
lation between the exchange rates at a given frequency and group delay can
be interpreted as the extent to which the exchange rate in the ﬁrst country
leads or lags that in the second country at a given frequency.9 If there are no
spillovers then coherence and group delay are zero by deﬁnition. According
to Table 3, weak unilateral spillovers create signiﬁcant coherence between ex-
change rates at very low frequencies, with the group delay statistic indicating
that the ﬁrst country leads the second country by just short of 20 periods.
There is very little coherence at frequencies higher than 0.08. The results are
consistent with contagion acting through jumps in the ﬁrst country trigger-
ing jumps in the second: coherence at low frequency matches the long period
between equilibrium jumps in Figure 1; a group delay of about 20 periods
conﬁrms the lead of the ﬁr s tc o u n t r yo v e rt h es e c o n ds e e ni nt h es i m u l a t i o n
of Figure 4.
9See Hannan and Thompson (1971) for more details on the interpretation of coherence
and group delay.






Table 3: Frequency domain properties of
exchange rates with weak unilateral spillovers
Our contention that spillovers are weak is based on the observation that
they only make a small contribution to the variance of output in the second
country. The robustness of this result is examined in Figure 5, which shows
how the share of output variance attributed to spillovers depends on 
∗,
the coeﬃcient on the unilateral spillover. As a comparison, we also show
the degree of contagion for each 
∗ by plotting the corresponding coherence
between exchange rates at low frequency (0.005Hz). At low levels of 
∗,t h e
share of variance is low and spillovers are weak. In contrast, coherence is
much higher and contagion is strong. Figure 5 provides the evidence for
the central claim of our paper: weak spillovers are suﬃcient to cause strong
contagion.
27Figure 5: Coherence and variance share of spillovers with unilateral spillovers
4 Model with weak bilateral spillovers
In a more general setting it is reasonable to believe that equilibrium jumps
may be mutually contagious from one small country to another. To allow
for this possibility, we introduce bilateral spillovers and rewrite the Phillips
curve equations as (14) and (14’). In this case, output in each small country
is inﬂuenced by the exchange rate of the other small country. We deﬁne
 = 
∗ =0 1 so spillovers are weak and symmetric.













Equilibrium in the model with weak bilateral spillovers is determined by
the system of equations (15), (15’), (16) and (16’).
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The frequency domain properties of exchange rates are reported in Table
4. The group delay statistics are zero because the model is symmetric, with
neither country having a systematic lead or lag over the other. Coherence
values are high, especially at low frequencies where they are more than double
the values observed under weak unilateral spillovers.






Table 4: Frequency domain properties of
exchange rates with weak bilateral spillovers
The fact that coherence with bilateral spillovers is more than double that
observed with unilateral spillovers suggests there is a strategic complemen-
29tarity in the model. The complementarity arises because of the way in which
exchange rates become more synchronised once an equilibrium jump in the
ﬁrst country triggers a jump in the second. With greater synchronisation,
both exchange rates tend to re-enter the danger zone around the Nash level
at about the same time and conditions are then highly conducive to a jump
in the second country triggering a jump in the ﬁrst. The contagion of a jump
from the ﬁrst to second country therefore increases the probability of experi-
encing contagion in the opposite direction in the future. Overall, coherence
is reinforced.
The ﬁnal piece of evidence that weak spillovers create strong contagion is
Figure 6, which shows the share of output variance due to spillovers and the
coherency of exchange rates at low frequency (0.005Hz) for diﬀerent bilateral
spillover coeﬃcients  = 
∗. In all cases, variance share is small relative to
coherence. For the baseline calibration,  = 
∗ =0 1,c o h e r e n c ei sm o r e
than ten times higher than the share of variance. We therefore conclude that
contagion is an order of magnitude stronger than the spillovers that create
it.
30Figure 6: Coherence and variance share of spillovers with bilateral spillovers
5 Conclusions
The central claim of this paper is that developments in one market may have
a profound eﬀect on other markets, even though at ﬁrst sight the other mar-
kets appear to be only weakly related. To obtain our result, we constructed
a simple model of two markets with weak spillovers from one market to an-
other. Following Sargent (1999), individual markets were characterised by
multiple equilibria and learning dynamics that occasionally caused them to
jump between equilibria. Our analysis showed that weak spillovers are suﬃ-
c i e n tt om a k eaj u m pi no n em a r k e ts i g n i ﬁcantly increase the probability of
a similar jump in the other market. We therefore concluded that equilibrium
jumps are strongly contagious in the model. Contagion occurs because a
31jump in one market spills over and creates conditions that are conducive to
aj u m pi nt h eo t h e rm a r k e t .
The claim that weak spillovers create strong contagion applies to a class
of models with weakly related markets and endogenous equilibrium jumps.
In our preferred example, we extended the model of Cho and Kasa (2003, p.
18-22) to show that currency crises may be contagious with only weak ﬁnan-
cial links between countries. In the model, endogenous equilibrium jumps
were equated to currency crises and spillovers were weak because they only
accounted for a small proportion of output ﬂuctuations in each country. Our
simulations indicated that a currency crisis in one country more than doubles
the probability of a currency crisis in another country. Currency crises are
therefore strongly contagious, with a crisis in one country highly likely to
trigger crises in other countries.
Other situations in which we expect to observe strong contagion with
weak spillovers are suggested by the models of Cho, Williams and Sargent
(2002) and Williams (2004). In monetary policy, a rapid disinﬂa t i o ni no n e
country may trigger a rapid disinﬂation in another country. With imperfect
competition, an outbreak of collusion in one market makes collusion more
likely in another market, even when the cross-price elasticity between the
two markets is low. For endogenous growth models, a growth spurt in one
country may create growth spurts in other countries.
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